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What are international tax 
disputes?
Formally, international tax disputes 
are between the tax authorities of two 
different countries. They result from 
differing interpretations of the provisions 
of a tax treaty between the two countries. 
However, they mainly affect taxpayers with 
cross-border economic activities, usually 
transnational corporations (TNCs). 
Tax treaties are normally incorporated into 
domestic law. So taxpayers can go to court 
if they disagree with how a treaty rule is 
applied. But tax treaties also give them the 
right to complain to the competent authority 
in the relevant national tax administration. 
The competent authority is obliged either 
to resolve the issue, or, under the mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP), to consult with 
the competent authority of the treaty partner. 
Under the MAP, the competent authorities 
must ‘endeavour’ to solve the problem – but 
are not obliged to do so. The MAP is totally 
secret. Even the existence of a claim is 
not made public. Tax advisers prefer the 
MAP over court cases, which generally 
are public. But they complain that the MAP 
takes too long, and does not guarantee 
an outcome. They have long urged that 
unresolved disputes should go to binding 
third party arbitration. 
The growth of disputes
Since 2006, the number of new MAP cases 
has doubled, and the number outstanding 
has more than doubled. Cases are taking 
longer to resolve. It seems that most cases 
concern the allocation of profits of TNCs 
among different taxing jurisdictions. A 
treaty between EU states has, since 1995, 
required transfer pricing cases which remain 
unresolved after two years to be referred to a 
Commission of experts and representatives 
of each tax authority. The Commission 
produces a reasoned opinion. This can only 
be published with the agreement of the 
parties to the dispute. No such opinion has 
ever been published, and in fact less than 
half a dozen cases have ever been referred 
to a Commission. The main effect has 
been to pressurise competent authorities to 
resolve cases within the two year deadline. 
Ten years ago, the US introduced a different 
form of arbitration, for cases with Canada 
and Germany, also for disputes unresolved 
within two years. Under this ‘baseball’ 
or ‘short-form’ procedure, the arbitrators 
cannot give their own independent opinion, 
but must choose between the last best 
offers tabled by the parties in dispute. The 
decisions must not be published, or even 
cited in later cases. Around ten arbitrations 
have taken place. 
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Neither of these procedures has slowed 
the growth of cases or the time taken to 
resolve them. Arbitration has been included 
in the OECD model convention (2007) 
and as an option in the UN model (2011). 
Over 200 actual treaties, including some 
with developing countries, now have some 
version of arbitration. A key issue is who 
can trigger arbitration. Under four of the 
developing country treaties the taxpayer 
can compel arbitration if the competent 
authorities cannot agree, as in the OECD 
model. The other treaties require the 
consent of either one or both competent 
authorities. However, developing countries 
have had few MAP cases, and most have 
rejected compulsory arbitration. Their 
experience with international investment 
arbitrations, some of which have involved 
tax matters, has been discouraging.
Causes and solutions
Most disputes concern the allocation of 
profits of TNCs, and the growth in disputes 
has occurred as enforcement of transfer 
pricing rules has strengthened. Developing 
countries have been introducing transfer 
pricing rules and are now improving 
enforcement. So TNCs fear there will be 
more disputes. This fear may be justified, 
since the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
are complex and do not provide clarity. 
They require tax officials to identify the 
functions performed by each part of the 
TNC, by analysing its business model. This 
requires specialised knowledge and involves 
discretionary and subjective judgements.
India saw a rapid rise in disputes after 
it introduced transfer pricing regulations 
based on the OECD Guidelines in 2001. 
By 2012 it had a backlog of over 3,000 tax 
tribunal cases. India does not publish MAP 
data, but a conflict between the US and 
Indian competent authorities became public, 
leading to the replacement of the Indian 
official in 2013. In January 2015 the two 
competent authorities signed a Framework 
Agreement intended to facilitate resolution 
of some 200 cases. A year later a statement 
said that about half had been resolved. In 
contrast, Brazil, which uses fixed transfer 
pricing margins, easy to administer but 
considered unorthodox by the OECD, has 
experienced little litigation and few MAP 
claims.
The G20/OECD project on base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) recommended that 
national tax officials dealing with the MAP 
should be separate from frontline tax audit 
staff and give autonomous decisions. This 
is difficult for tax authorities that are already 
under-resourced, especially in developing 
countries. The proposals are designed to 
strengthen the international community of 
specialists in the MAP. It includes the private 
sector tax advisers, many of whom are 
former public officials, and is dominated by 
experts from OECD countries. Arbitrators 
are drawn from this community, and would 
reject interpretations that it considers 
unorthodox. Monitoring through peer review 
would reinforce this culture, and secrecy 
would be retained, despite public suspicions 
about cosy deals. 
A better way forward
The aim should be to minimise conflicts by 
making the rules easier to apply and clearer. 
The MAP should be used to agree general 
interpretations that can be published, 
dealing not only with taxpayer claims of 
double taxation, but also issues of double 
non-taxation, which are especially important 
in this period of change. The Framework 
Agreement between India and the US was 
successful, but could have had a greater 
impact if it had been published. 
Furthermore, publication of the outcomes of 
actual MAP cases would provide guidance 
for other taxpayers, help ensure that like 
cases are treated alike, and reassure a 
wider public that decisions are fair. Reforms 
should aim to allocate the profits of TNC 
groups based on clear and quantifiable 
factors that reflect the actual economic 
activities and value created in each country. 
This would both reduce the number of 
conflicts and ensure that the disputes 
that do occur can be adjudicated in a 
transparent, fair and consistent manner.
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